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“THERE MUST BE A MEANS”—THE BACKWARD
JURISPRUDENCE OF BAZE V. REES
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The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees begins with
1
a seemingly simple assertion of constitutional law. “We begin with
the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitu2
tional.” It continues, “[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a
3
means of carrying it out.” This second pronouncement provides the
foundation for the Supreme Court’s holding in Baze that Kentucky’s
refusal to modify its lethal injection procedure does not violate the
Eighth Amendment. However, in taking the position that the constitutionality of an existing method of capital punishment is dependent
on the availability of alternative execution procedures, the Supreme
Court has turned Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on its head, establishing a dangerous loophole that could imperil our most important constitutional protections. This essay highlights the error in the
Court’s reasoning in Baze and considers the potentially troubling
consequences of applying this reasoning to other areas of constitutional law.
***
In Baze v. Rees, two death row prisoners brought an Eighth
4
Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. The
protocol in question required that a team of individuals, each having
at least one year’s experience as a medical assistant, phlebotomist, or
paramedic, intravenously administer a series a three drugs that lead
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5

to the prisoner’s death. The Kentucky protocol prohibited physician
involvement in the procedure, except as necessary to certify the cause
of death or, in the case of a last-minute stay of execution, to revive the
6
prisoner. The Baze petitioners argued that because the members of
the team administering the lethal drugs had limited qualifications
and training, the protocol posed an “unnecessary risk” of pain and
7
suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The petitioners also identified alternative procedures (involving licensed physicians
and a different series of drugs) that Kentucky could adopt to lessen
this risk.
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ proposed “unnecessary risk” standard. Instead, it held that an execution method does
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment unless it presents a “substantial” or “objectively in8
tolerable” risk of serious harm. The Court also responded directly to
petitioners’ claim that Kentucky erred by failing to adopt safer execu9
tion procedures.
A petitioner “cannot successfully challenge a
[s]tate’s method of execution,” wrote the Court, “merely by showing
10
a slightly or marginally safer alternative.” Rather, to demonstrate
that a state’s refusal to modify its execution procedure violates the
Eighth Amendment, the Court held that a petitioner must identify an
alternative procedure that is “feasible, readily implemented, and in
11
fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.” With
respect to the alternative procedures proposed by the petitioners in
Baze, the plurality noted that petitioners were unable to show that
12
these procedures actually reduce a substantial risk of pain and,
moreover, that at least one of the proposed alternatives was not feasi13
ble.
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The first drug, sodium thiopental (Pentothal), is a short-acting barbiturate. The second
drug, pancuronium bromide (Pavulon), is a paralytic agent. The third drug, potassium
chloride, stops the heart. Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 50–51.
One of the questions presented in Baze was: “Do the means for carrying out an execution
cause an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment
upon a showing that readily available alternatives that pose less risk of pain and suffering
could be used?” Brief for Petitioners at i, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), (No. 07-5439).
Baze, 553 at 51.
Id. at 52. The petitioners must also demonstrate that the state has no “legitimate penological justification” for its refusal to adopt the alternative. Id.
Id. at 57–59 (noting that the additional procedures requested by petitioners have not
been scientifically proven to reduce the risk of pain).
“The asserted need for a professional anesthesiologist to interpret the BIS monitor readings is nothing more than an argument against the entire procedure, given that both
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In so holding, the Court answered two questions—first, what the
appropriate standard of risk is in Eighth Amendment cases challenging the method of capital punishment; and second, what effect, if
any, the availability of alternative procedures may have. However, in
presenting its discussion of the “availability of alternatives” as a core
part of its holding, the Court not only muddied the theoretical waters, but in fact took a position on this issue that seems fundamentally
incorrect.
If we begin with the premise, established in Baze, that an execution method is constitutional unless it presents a “substantial risk of
serious harm,” then it is difficult to see why the availability of alternative execution procedures would be relevant, let alone dispositive.
That is, if a state’s execution procedure does not pose a substantial
risk of serious harm (as the Court found to be the case with the Kentucky protocol), then it does not violate the Eighth Amendment, re14
gardless of any available alternatives. If, on the other hand, an execution procedure by its very nature poses a “substantial risk of
serious harm,” then presumably it is unconstitutional, at least as a
prima facie matter. In this case, as well, the availability of alternative
procedures would not seem to affect the substantive constitutional
analysis—the existence of a safer alternative might strengthen the
finding of unconstitutionality, but the lack of a safer alternative
would not render an unconstitutional method permissible. Or would
it? The position seemingly taken by the Supreme Court in Baze suggests that perhaps it would.
In a case in which a state is using a substantially risky execution
procedure but evidence fails to identify a safer alternative, a court has
two options. It can find the procedure unconstitutional as a definitional matter based on the substantial risk standard (in which case
the availability of alternatives is irrelevant); this seems to be the logical solution. Or, potentially, the court could uphold the admittedly
risky procedure on the grounds that there is no better alternative. If
we are to take seriously the Supreme Court’s holding in Baze about
the constitutional implications of alternative execution procedures—

14

Kentucky law and the American Society of Anesthesiologists’ own ethical guidelines prohibit anesthesiologists from participating in capital punishment.” Id. at 59–60 (internal
citations omitted); see also id. at 64–65 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing a policy statement by
the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, which states
that “[a] physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is
hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
In such a case, the availability of better alternatives would not impact the constitutional
analysis because there is no “substantial risk” to be lessened.
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that is, if it is to carry any substantive weight—then we cannot help
but conclude that the availability of alternatives would make a difference in at least some cases. In other words, while the availability of
alternatives would never make unconstitutional a constitutional execution procedure, a lack of feasible alternatives might save a facially
prohibited procedure. This result, I argue, is one that we cannot accept.
What do we really mean when we talk about the constitutionality
of capital punishment? Gregg v. Georgia, cited in Baze, held that “the
infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justifi15
cation and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.” In so holding,
however, the Supreme Court answered in the negative only the broad
question of whether a death sentence is a penalty that is inherently
disproportionate to the crime of murder (as compared to other possible penalties, such as life imprisonment or hard labor). It did not,
however, speak to the specific methods by which the death penalty
may be permissibly imposed, except to say that “the punishment must
16
not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Indeed,
the bulk of the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence in the
past century and a half has focused on the question of proportionali17
ty, rather than methodology. Only three times in its history has the
Court considered the constitutionality of a particular method of capital punishment; each time, the Court has upheld the method at issue,
18
finding that it does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court had never used the constitutionality of capital punishment
under a proportionality analysis as a general matter to defend a particular method of execution. In Baze, however, the Court took this
position quite explicitly, finding that because capital punishment is
constitutional as a matter of principle under Gregg, “[i]t necessarily
follows that there must be a means of carrying it out” in a constitu15
16
17

18

428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
Id. at 173. Indeed, the Court in Gregg expressly distinguished its decision about proportionality from prior Supreme Court decisions about methodology. Id. at 170–71.
See Katie Roth Heilman, Comment, Contemplating “Cruel and Unusual”: A Critical Analysis
of Baze v. Rees in the Context of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment “Proportionality” Jurisprudence, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 633, 640–43 (2009) (discussing post-Gregg challenges to the
constitutionality of the death penalty as focused on the issue of “disproportionate punishment”).
See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding that, where a
first attempt at execution by electrocution was unsuccessful as a result of an “unforeseeable accident,” a second attempt would not violate the Eighth Amendment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890) (refusing to reexamine the New York court’s holding in favor of a statute authorizing execution by electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
130 (1878) (upholding the constitutionality of execution by firing squad).
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tional manner. This conclusion is also supported by the Court’s
holding regarding alternative execution procedures, which suggests
that the availability of alternatives may be relevant to the constitutional analysis of an existing procedure.
The problem with this reasoning should be clear: Using the constitutional permissibility of a death sentence as a theoretical matter to
uphold a specific method of capital punishment defies the notion of
constitutional protection. Constitutional protections exist to protect
citizens in precisely those situations where the state would seek to
override them on the grounds of utility, yet the Supreme Court in
Baze seems to do just that. Consider the following hypothetical: Imagine that all legal executions in America took place in a mysterious
“black box” that has fallen from space, marked only with a sign reading, “Death Apparatus for Condemned Prisoners.” The prisoner enters the black box, the door locks behind him automatically, and, after some specified period of time, the door opens, revealing the
deceased prisoner. There is no noise, there are no marks on the
prisoner, and autopsy technology is not advanced enough to determine the cause of death. Neither the warden nor onlookers have any
idea what happens in the box, except that it inevitably results in the
prisoner’s death. As a matter of definition, therefore, it is simply impossible to know what the prisoner is experiencing in the box,
whether he is suffering any pain, and whether more traditional methods of execution (hanging, firing squad, lethal gas) might be less
painful. According to Baze, the black box method of execution would
be constitutionally permissible because no plaintiff would be able to
demonstrate that it entails a substantial risk of severe pain.
Imagine, now, that technology has advanced such that scientists
are able to determine exactly what takes place in the “Death Apparatus for Condemned Prisoners.” It turns out that the black box houses
an alien life form that releases a biological agent affecting human
nerve cells. A prisoner who enters an enclosed container with this
life form experiences excruciating nerve pain for six hours, akin to
the feeling of being burned alive. After that time, the nerves, brain,
and spinal cord simply shut down, and the prisoner dies. Imagine,
furthermore, that for some reason or another, there exist no alternative methods of execution—in this world, guns have been banned;
prison officials are not permitted to hold any weapons, even for legitimate penal purposes; and humans have developed natural defenses
to the lethal gas and deadly drugs once used for executions. If the
19

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008).
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Supreme Court’s holding in Baze is to be taken seriously, then the
black box execution method, no matter how agonizing, would be
constitutionally permitted on the grounds that there exist no feasible,
readily implemented, and less painful alternatives.
Readers may question the legitimacy of this hypothetical, and I
admit that it is somewhat fanciful. That said, the most vehement critics of lethal injection technology might view the black box scenario as
an apt analogy, given that the second drug in the standard three-drug
protocol is a paralytic that effectively masks any outward evidence of
20
what the prisoner might be experiencing. Furthermore, the paucity
of scientific and medical research in this area makes it difficult to
know whether and to what extent a prisoner might suffer if the drugs
are improperly administered (which is not an uncommon occur21
rence). Moreover, one could argue that, due to limitations imposed
by the Constitution and by principles of medical and research ethics,
there are few, reasonable alternatives to the current three-drug pro22
tocol. In other words, while we currently have a basic sense of what
happens during an execution by lethal injection, our knowledge is
necessarily limited in much the same way as in the black box scenario.
***
I argue that an execution procedure that poses a substantial risk
of severe pain cannot be bootstrapped into constitutional permissibility by reference to the constitutionality of capital punishment as a
general matter and the lack of identified alternative procedures. In
such cases, the appropriate solution is to reject the existing method
of capital punishment and work harder to identify alternative methods that do not pose a risk of severe pain—not to maintain the existing procedure out of necessity.
This distinction between constitutionality of a practice in theory
and its implementation in fact is an essential part of our constitutional jurisprudence. To draw just one comparison, the Supreme Court
20

21

22

See generally Mark Heath, The Medicalization of Execution: Lethal Injection in the United States,
in PUBLIC HEALTH BEHIND BARS: FROM PRISONS TO COMMUNITIES 92, 92–93 (Robert Greifinger ed., 2007) (discussing the masking effects of pancuronium bromide and
the physical pain that prisoners may feel when they undergo lethal injection).
See Nadia N. Sawicki, Doctors, Discipline, and the Death Penalty: Professional Implications of Safe
Harbor Policies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 107, 158–159 n.245 (2008) (citing evidence of
administration errors dating back to the first execution by lethal injection in 1982).
See Baze, 553 U.S. at 57–59 (describing the inadequacy of additional procedures proposed
by petitioners).
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held in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) that segregated educational facilities violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four23
teenth Amendment. After Brown I, some states were unwilling or
unable to transition to an inclusive system of public education, leading the Court to take up the issue of administration in a later opi24
nion. Citing the importance of the plaintiffs’ personal interests in
indiscriminate admission to public schools, the Court insisted that
states make good faith attempts to comply with its ruling despite the
“variety of obstacles,” “complexities,” and “local school problems” in25
volved. Ultimately, this required massive changes not only to the
drawing of school districts, but also to the physical plants of the public schools, their transportation systems, their security systems, and
even their personnel. “[I]t should go without saying,” wrote the
Court, “that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be
26
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.” Similarly, I argue, the vitality of the constitutional principles underlying
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment cannot be allowed to yield simply because no clear alternatives
to current execution technology have been identified.
Of course, the school segregation narrative differs somewhat from
the capital punishment narrative in that the Constitution grants a
positive right to equal protection of the laws, whereas the right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment is instead a negative right.
Had the Constitution also granted a positive right on the part of citizenry to engage in capital punishment, then the Supreme Court’s
statement in Baze would be more defensible. If a finding that lethal
injection violates the Eighth Amendment means that the state is unable to implement a (hypothetical) constitutional duty to execute its
worst offenders, then perhaps it makes sense to choose to protect this
27
right first and retain the existing lethal injection procedure. On the
23
24
25
26
27

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reargued on the question of relief, 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
For a similar argument, consider Ronald Dworkin’s conclusion that where there is no
choice but to violate one of two conflicting individual rights, it is morally permissible to
violate the less important one. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193–94
(1977). Indeed, Dworkin argues that it is actually the government’s job to make such decisions when rights are in conflict, noting that “it is the job of government to discriminate.” Id. at 193. I, however, disagree with Dworkin’s conclusion that the state, when
faced with the violation of two competing rights, would be morally justified in making either decision on the basis of necessity. I do not find logical necessity a sufficient moral
justification in this case. Arguably, either course of action may be morally permissible, in
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other hand, perhaps the school segregation narrative is not so different—the Federal Constitution does not establish a positive right to
education; accordingly, faced with the challenge of implementing an
unpopular desegregation policy, states could (barring state constitutional requirements) have simply abandoned the practice of providing public education altogether. Instead, state courts and elected officials worked against a sea of practical and political problems to
implement the Supreme Court’s judgment.
***
Given these implications, why, one wonders, did the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Baze even address the availability of alternative execution procedures? The Court could have easily upheld Kentucky’s
lethal injection procedure simply by establishing the “substantial risk
of severe pain” standard and finding that the Kentucky protocol did
not pose such a risk. The discussion of alternative procedures was
neither necessary nor particularly relevant to the Court’s final deci28
sion.
The best explanation for why the Court took this approach, I posit, is because it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity provided
in Baze to offer states another avenue of appeal in Eighth Amendment cases. Had the Court not addressed the issue of alternative
procedures in Baze, then the next time a litigant persuaded a lower
court that his state’s execution procedure posed a substantial risk of
serious harm (or, at least, a more substantial risk than that posed by
the Kentucky lethal injection procedure), the state might have no
choice but to amend its procedure. By establishing a second constitutional hurdle for Eighth Amendment litigants to overcome, the
Court increased the likelihood that a state could wage a successful defense in such cases. In fact, the Court’s holding about alternative execution procedures may have a significant impact on trial practice in
Eighth Amendment cases: State attorneys general will likely focus
their efforts at trial on excluding as much evidence as possible regarding alternative procedures. Because the evidentiary hurdle for
plaintiffs under the Supreme Court’s Baze standard is so high—they
must identify an alternative procedure and demonstrate that it is not
only feasible and readily implemented, but also that it substantially

28

that an actor faced with two, logically inconsistent alternatives cannot be paralyzed by
morality. However, neither act seems morally justifiable as the “morally right” thing to do.
In this sense, the Court’s decision, from a case and controversy perspective, was much
broader than necessary.
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reduces the risk of pain—any uncertainties about the availability of
alternatives will likely be resolved in the state’s favor.
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding about alternative
procedures in Baze effectively preserves the constitutionality of capital
punishment as a general practice. Had the Court not addressed this
issue, then a plaintiff who successfully demonstrates that his state’s
execution procedure poses a substantial risk of serious harm might
also seek to overturn Gregg by arguing that, in fact, none of the available alternative procedures satisfy the substantial risk test. But by specifying in Baze that neither the constitutionality of a specific execution method nor the constitutionality of the practice of capital
punishment in general can be called into question by noting the absence of alternative procedures, the Court was able to defuse future
Eighth Amendment challenges in this vein.
As noted above, I do not believe that the Court’s decision in Baze
was the appropriate resolution of this issue. If a state’s execution
procedure is ever found unconstitutional on the ground that it poses
a substantial risk of serious harm, and no alternative procedures are
identified during trial, one obvious solution would be to direct the
state’s department of correction to make an active effort to investigate and evaluate alternatives beyond those that may have been im29
mediately apparent at trial. This would conform with the way in
which courts typically resolve as-applied challenges—by maintaining
the validity of a practice as a whole, while invalidating one or more
30
particular applications of that practice on constitutional grounds.
29

30

As much was suggested by Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion. Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 123 (2008) (suggesting that the case be remanded with instructions to consider
whether the risk of serious harm might be avoided if “readily available safeguards” were
added to the Kentucky protocol). Lest critics object that investigating alternative execution procedures would be an exercise in futility (whether due to opposition from the
medical and scientific communities or otherwise), note that execution technologies have
developed dramatically in the past century and a half, advancing from hanging, to firing
squad, to electrocution, to lethal gas, to, finally, lethal injection. And while there have
been no advances in execution technology since the development of lethal injection
technology in 1976, this seems to be the result of an unwillingness on the part of states to
consider or investigate other methods, rather than a lack of available methods per se. See
Sawicki, supra note 21, at 152 n.220 (noting that the pursuit of alternate methods of capital punishment has not been explored). For descriptions of historical attempts by state
governments to evaluate various execution technologies, see N.Y. COMM’N ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE MOST
HUMANE AND PRACTICAL METHOD OF CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN
CAPITAL CASES (1888), and Melvin F. Wingersky, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment (1949-1953): A Review, 44 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 695 (1954).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (holding that a facial challenge to
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act should never have been entertained and that an asapplied challenge is the proper means by which to consider exceptions to the Act); Unit-
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Though it may result in practical difficulties in implementing capital
punishment, such an approach would be more defensible on theoretical grounds.
An alternative solution—particularly if attempts to identify alternative execution procedures are unsuccessful—might be to reconsider the theoretical presumption that the practice of capital punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment. In other words, if all
(or most) execution methods are found to result in a substantial risk
of serious harm, then perhaps we ought to rethink the constitutionality of capital punishment as a whole. While a single as-applied challenge will not suffice to overturn an established practice, perhaps a
series of successful challenges might lead a court to conclude that a
practice that cannot be implemented in fact should be deemed unconstitutional in theory.
At this point, I do not stake a claim to one or the other of these
approaches. However, it is important that we consider both of them
as alternatives to the Supreme Court’s current approach, which
would use a principle of “constitutionality by default” to uphold a patently problematic execution procedure where no alternatives are
available.

ed States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–79 (1995) (holding that a
ban on honoraria for government employees violates the First Amendment only as applied to certain junior employees); see also Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme
Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1647–49 (describing the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied challenges as consistent with historical concerns
about judicial restraint).

